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KELLY CHARLES CRABB*
The Reality of Extralegal Barriers to
Mergers and Acquisitions in Japant
The phenomenal success of Japanese industry in the last two decades
has been accompanied by a steady increase in interest among foreign
investors to gain a foothold in Japan.' In 1980 Japanese lawmakers made
a significant change in the laws affecting foreign investment, 2 which seemed
to open the way, but the legal victory so far has appeared to be an empty
one. Acquiring or merging with a Japanese company, for example, has
been said to be virtually impossible. Japan observers have explained that
the difficulty stems not so much from legal as extralegal obstacles; social
and cultural factors are among the chief reasons cited for the lack of
merger activity in Japan.
3
This article explores these extralegal barriers to mergers and acquisi-
tions in Japan. Specifically, this article discusses the advantages of merg-
ers and acquisitions as compared with other forms of investment; indeed,
a strong argument can be made that perhaps, formidable barriers not-
withstanding, the quest for a willing Japanese target may be worth the
effort. This article next analyzes the reputed political, social, and cultural
barriers against the backdrop of legal developments to see how such
barriers act to prohibit not only foreign, but all merger and acquisition
activity in Japan. There appears to be some truth to the reality of extralegal
*B.A., 1971, M.P.A., 1973, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1984, Columbia University.
Member of the Bar of the State of New York and an associate in the firm of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York, New York.
tThe Editorial Reviewer for this article is Rebecca Martin Seaman.
1. See Myers, Investments in the Far East and South-East Asia, 132 NEW L.J. 907 (1982).
2. Law Concerning Partial Amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Con-
trol Law Act, Law No. 65 of 1979, amending Foreign Exchange and Trade Law, MINPO
(Civil Code), Law No. 228 of 1949 [hereinafter FECL].
3. See, e.g., Abegglen, Can Japanese Companies Be Acquired?, 17 MERGERS & AcQUi-
SiTION, Winter 1983, at 16.
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barriers in Japan, but at least some of this reality arises from phenomena
not so unfamiliar in the United States. Lastly, this article proposes a list
of suggestions borne out of an analysis of extralegal barriers that can be
followed to achieve the goal of a successful acquisition in Japan. Although
the barriers are real, for the brave crusader who has adequately assessed
his business objectives and who is willing to work within the confines of
the system, the prize may lie within the realm of conquest.
1. The Allure of the Prize
Despite the highly touted barriers, recent merger and acquisition activ-
ity in Japan, such as Merck & Co.'s acquisition of fifty-one percent of
Banyu Pharmaceutical Co. of Tokyo in 1983 and Trafalgar Holding's at-
tempted acquisition of Minebea in the fall of 1985, 4 demonstrates a high
degree of motivation on the part of foreign enterprises. Indeed the fol-
lowing discussion shows that there are many advantages, albeit some
pitfalls, in acquiring Japanese companies.
A. ADVANTAGES OF ACQUISITIONS IN JAPAN:
THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
As is the case with acquisitions generally, acquiring a Japanese company
can cut some of the start-up costs of doing business. In large sophisticated
markets, such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and machinery, the com-
petition is strong, distribution channels are already developed, and the
need for trained and experienced staff is immediate. Entry into this type
of market may be expensive and risk prone when starting from scratch. 5
In Japan, acquisition of or merger with a Japanese company may be
the only means of accomplishing business objectives. First, top rate man-
agement and labor are difficult to obtain; the special nature of the Japanese
employment system leads to relatively little lateral mobility, and almost
all new hirees come directly from college. 6 Second, distributors and other
collateral support for doing business, such as subcontractors, are closely
aligned with the Japanese companies they serve;7 gaining access to these
support services might be difficult for a newcomer, especially a foreigner.8
4. See Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1983, at 6, col. I [hereinafter Merck-Banyu] (discussing Merck's
acquisition of Banyu); N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 33, col. 3 (discussing Trafalgar Holdings,
Inc.'s bid for Minebea Co., Ltd.).
5. See Abegglen, supra note 3, at 16.
6. See, e.g., M. YOSHINO, JAPAN'S MANAGERIAL SYSTEM 229-31 (1968).
7. Id. at 159, 192-93.
8. See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN; LAWS AND POLICIES 217-18
(1973) (noting that antipathy for foreign involvement in certain segments of Japanese society
is historically rooted); Weil & Glick, Japan-Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese
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Third, Japanese competition is fierce, and advertising, promotion, and
other start-up and operating expenses are extremely high. 9 All of these
difficulties could be minimized through the acquisition of an ongoing
business.
There are also economic lures to acquisitions in Japan. An acquisition
might give ready access to valuable technology and facilities.' 0 In addi-
tion, the typical Japanese company follows the practice of understating
on its books certain capital assets, especially land." Further, Japanese
companies have traditionally been structured on a high debt to equity ratio
and, thus, a smaller investment of capital procures a larger asset base
than would be the case in the United States. 12 Also, at least in the recent
past, corporate tax rates in Japan have been relatively reasonable. 13 These
factors, assuming the relative stability of the U.S. dollar, appear to make
the acquisition of a Japanese company a "windfall." 14
Finally, reasons related to the Japanese political system make acqui-
sitions attractive to the foreigner. Licenses and government approvals
might already be in place or easier to obtain. 15 Relations with various
government agencies, such as the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) as well as industry associations, and bank circles, could
be enhanced. 16 Important community relations could also be facilitated. 17
In sum, given the unique character of the Japanese business, political,
and social structure-discussed in greater detail below-acquisition as a
means to penetrate a Japanese market makes a great deal of sense. Indeed,
one author has argued that for a foreign company to enter Japan except
through an acquisition is now nearly impossible.18
Market Drawn from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 845, 850-51
(1979) (two sources of lingering bitterness on the part of Japanese are the imposition on
Japan of treaties granting western powers extraterritorial rights and Japan's loss of duty
and customs control to the West in the late 1800s).
9. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 16.
10. Nishimura, Acquisitions in Japan, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
1981, at 93, 94 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 1981).
II. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 16; see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 20, 1986, at I
(discussing the meaning of the differences in philosophies to stockholders of American and
Japanese corporations in the case of the dissolution of the company).
12. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 20, 1986, at 1.
13. PATRICK & RosoVSKY, ASIA'S NEW GIANT 900 (1976) (favorable tax rates due to low
deficits may be changing as pressure for increased military spending mounts).
14. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 16 ("bargain"); Reynolds, Foreign Investment in Japan:
The Legal and Social Climate, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 175, 181 (1983). But see infra notes 85-88
and accompanying text (noting that the price of stock can be manipulated by the companies).
15. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 94.
16. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 16.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 17.
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B. THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE
Acquisitions and mergers cannot be viewed analytically as all bad from
the Japanese side. The Japanese Government, for example, has at several
times in recent history actively encouraged mergers as a way of solving prob-
lems of scale prevalent among several Japanese industries. 19 Even with gov-
ernment pressure, mergers do not always occur. Japan's chemical industry,
forexample, is said to have too many producers for efficiency. 20 Historically,
in the United States in such a situation, mergers or sales and acquisitions of
producers have been used to achieve the appropriate economy of scale to
compete. 21 In Japan, however, a failure to merge has caused misallocation
of capital among many small, inefficient producers.
On the company level also the potentiality for gain exists. Large Jap-
anese companies that diversified in periods of high growth might now
benefit by selling off small, inefficient subsidiaries to companies that are
seeking to increase production capabilities or to take advantage of possible
synergies which might arise. 22 Moreover, where the acquiring company
is foreign, there is the potential for gaining access to technology and
perhaps even access to foreign markets through shared ownership and
new connections the foreign enterprise might have. 23 The reality is, how-
ever, that Japanese companies rarely merge or sell off inefficient subsid-
iaries to outsiders, especially foreigners. 24
II. The Nature of Barriers to Acquisitions in Japan
Pressure from abroad for a relaxation of the policies discouraging ac-
quisitions and mergers in Japan started to mount in the early 1960s. In
1980 significant changes in the laws concerning foreign investments in
public and private Japanese companies became effective. The rhetoric
19. M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 181 ("[T]he increase of productive efficiency through
mergers and joint acts of highly fragmented firms, has received the utmost priority.").
20. See R. CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 62 (1979); Abegglen, supra note 3, at 17.
21. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 17. For a discussion of the boom periods in United States
merger and acquisition activity, see generally BREALEY & MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 722 (2d ed. 1983).
22. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 17.
23. There is some speculation, for example, that Isuzu's acquiescence in GM's acquiring
a substantial share of its stock was motivated by a desire to break into the U.S. market.
24. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 184 (arguing that an American charge of lack of
reciprocity in acquisitions is likely to fail because "Japan does give foreign companies the
same treatment as it gives local companies when it comes to acquisition: Neither can buy
Japanese companies.") (citation omitted); see also Nippon Hodo Co. v. United Statos, 285
F.2d 766 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ("national treatment" was satisfied if U.S. plaintiffs in Japan are
treated the same as Japanese plaintiffs in Japan); D. HENDERSON, supra note 8, at 217-18
(noting antipathy for foreigners). But cf. M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 189-90 (noting
successful mergers and future plans for mergers between Japanese companies.).
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surrounding the adaptation of the new laws, along with the logical ad-
vantages to acquisitions and mergers noted above, might well lead to the
conclusion that acquisitions or mergers are or will become commonplace;
however, a closer look reveals that these new laws are, for now at least,




After World War II, during the 1950s and 1960s, United States enter-
prises began moving into European markets by acquiring European com-
panies, often with loans from European banks. Interest in Japanese mar-
kets did not fully ripen until the late 1960s. The Japanese, fully aware of
what they saw as the American takeover of Europe, began to put in place
legal obstacles to foreign control.
26
The Foreign Investment Law of 1950 (FIL)27 and the Foreign Exchange
and Trade Control Law of 1949 (FECL)28 formed the basis for legal control
of foreign investment activity in Japan. These laws made it impossible
for foreign companies to engage in contested takeovers. 29 Any single
foreign bidder was limited to a ten percent holding; any group of foreign
investors was limited to twenty-five percent. 30 Most importantly, all for-
eign investments in Japan, including stock acquisitions, were subject to
approval from the Japanese Government. 3 1 Needless to say, acquisition
activity under this system was minimal. One author reports, moreover,
that even since 1971, the year in which the law was amended to regulate
attempted takeovers, the only application of the law was in 1972 when
Bendix Corporation succeeded through a friendly bid to gain a twenty
percent holding of Jidosha Kiko Co.
32
As Japanese surpluses began to mount in the late 1970s foreign nations
lead by the United States criticized Japan for being a closed nation. 33 The
25. Nishimura, Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan: Rules of the Unplayed Game, 17
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1983, at 20.
26. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 182.
27. Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 163 of 1950 (amended in 1964).
28. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, Law No. 228 of 1949.
29. Cf. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 58 n.1 (when Sanko Steamship tried a forceable
takeover of Japan Line between 1971-73, the Japanese Government intervened to prevent
it).
30. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 182 n.54.
31. Nishimura, supra note 25, at 21.
32. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 97 n.4. A second possible takeover under the new law
was the 1975 bid by Okinawa Electric Co. to obtain the stock of certain regional power
distribution companies in Okinawa.
33. Seki, Foreign Exchange Law: Major Points in the Revision of the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law, I JAPAN Bus. L.J. 8, 9 (1980).
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basis for Americans' contention was the U.S.-Japan Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation Treaty (FCN Treaty), 34 signed by the two nations
in 1957, with its reciprocal grant of most-favored-nation status. The Amer-
icans claimed, moreover, that the continuation of post-occupation controls
was no longer necessary.35 In 1978 Japan promised true liberalization. 36
2. Legal Changes
At the start of 1980 the Japanese Government abolished the old FIL 37
and enacted significant amendments to the FECL. 38 Under the amended
legal regime government approval is no longer needed; rather, acquiring
corporations are merely required to file a "report." 39 The Ministry of
Finance (MOF) and other competent ministries may "investigate" if the
acquisition, among other things: threatens the national security, disturbs
the maintenance of public order, hampers the protection of the safety of
the general public, or adversely and seriously affects the smooth perfor-
mance of the Japanese economy.40 These investigations could result in
modifying the terms of, or prohibiting totally, the proposed acquisition. 41
The amended FECL also does away with the limits on the percentage
of shares which can be acquired. Provisions in the new law permit, in
principle, up to 100 percent ownership, except in certain circumstances
described below. The requirement of shareholder approval, however, still
remains under the Japanese Commercial Code42 and Securities and Ex-
change Law43 in situations where the issuance of new shares is done at
a price that is deemed "specifically favorable." 44 In such a situation, at
least two-thirds of the shareholders present at a meeting of shareholders
at which more than one-half of the total shares are represented must
approve of the sale.45 In addition, a tender offer of existing shares, in
which currently listed or registered shares are to be transferred outside
the stock exchange and offered to "unspecified and many" persons, and
in which the shares to be acquired either by an individual company or by
34. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
35. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 192.
36. Seki, supra note 33, at 9.
37. Nishimura, supra note 25, at 20.
38. Id.; see FECL, supra note 2, Law No. 65 of 1979, amending Law No. 228 of 1949.
39. FECL, supra note 2, art. 26, § 3.
40. Id. art. 27, §§ 1(1) & 1(2).
41. Id. art. 27, § 2.
42. SHOHO (Commercial Code), Law No. 42 of 1868 (as amended).
43. SHOKEN TORIHIKI Ho (Securities Code), Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended).
44. Siiono (Commercial Code), art. 280-2(1); see Nishimura, supra note 25, at 22 ("spe-
cially favorable" explained).
45. SHOHO (Commercial Code), art. 343.
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a group (consisting of such company and other related persons) equal ten
percent or more of the total number of outstanding shares of the target,
normally requires the filing of a registration statement with MOF, which
reviews the statement and publishes it. 46 The target corporation, MOF,
the stock exchange, and the public are all aware of the bid.
The purchase of the assets of a target corporation is also possible under
the new law.47 If the acquiring corporation proposes to buy all of the
assets of the target, the shareholders of both corporations must approve
the contract. 48 If a substantial percentage short of 100 percent of the
assets are to be purchased, again, shareholder approvals are required; a
dissenting shareholder may require the target corporation to purchase his
shares at fair market value. 49 Further, if registrable assets such as build-
ings or land are part of the deal, various governmental permits and ap-
provals are required. Likewise, the transfer of assets such as employee
contracts, loan agreements, and leases may require the consent of the
employee, the lender, and the lessor.50
Under the new legal system, mergers are also possible. The merging
companies must both be Japanese, but an American subsidiary organized
in Japan can qualify.51 When one of the two parties continues to exist
and the other is liquidated, 52 the parties must agree in writing on the
essential terms and both corporations' shareholders must approve the
agreement by special resolution. Objecting shareholders can require the
target to purchase their shares. 53 Also, both corporations must notify
their creditors of the proposed merger and liquidate the obligations of any
objecting creditors. 54
The new law is genuinely more liberal than its predecessors. Acquisi-
tions are theoretically possible by purchasing new or existing shares or
by buying all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation, as well as
by merger. The only legal barriers that the law leaves intact are certain
"sovereignty" barriers and approvals by shareholders and, in some cases,
46. See SEIRE! (Ministerial Order) of 1965, art. 8, No. 321; SHOKEN ToRIHIKi Ho (Security
and Exchange Law), arts. 27-2, 27-3(1) & (2), 27-4; see also Nishimura, supra note 25, at
22 (explaining the impracticality of a takeover attempt).
47. Nishimura, supra note 25, at 22.
48. SHOHO (Commercial Code), arts. 245(1) & 343.
49. Id. art. 245-2.
50. Nishimura, supra note 25, at 24; cf. U.C.C. § 6-106 (bulk sales provision requires that
creditors of acquired corporation be paid before transfer of shares; but only one-third of
states have enacted this rule and in others it is standard business practice to ignore the
provision).
51. Nishimura, supra note 25, at 24.
52. The most favorable of two possible options, see id.
53. SHOHO (Commercial Code), arts. 408-3, 409, 410.
54. Id. arts, 416 & 100.
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by directors, government agencies, creditors, and employees. These re-
maining conditions, however, when coupled with the will to resist, can
be devastating to foreign entities in search of an investment in the Japanese
market.
3. Government Intervention-The Katakura Incident
The case involving Katakura Kogyo 55 illustrates the potential flimsiness
of the new liberalization because of the Japanese Government's willing-
ness to intervene. The FECL and certain administrative orders provide
that the percent of ownership may not exceed an established percentage
in "matters producing interference with the protection of public safety,
hindering the maintenance of public order, or damaging the nation's
safety." 56 In 1981 Wang Tseng Hsiang, chairman of the investment firm
of Newpis Hong Kong Ltd., made a bid to increase his group's holding
in Katakura Kogyo from 23.5 percent to a controlling interest. 57 The
Japanese government decided to set the limit for foreign ownership of
Katakura, a diversified silk spinning company at twenty-five percent by
invoking the above "safety" provision. 58 Wang asserted that the restric-
tion was unjustified and was contrary to Japan's commitments to the
international community. He also stated that he had no intention of chang-
ing the nature of the firm or its business and that foreign acquisition of
Katakura's shares does not constitute a threat to Japan's economy or
security.59 Wang, nevertheless, encountered direct governmental barriers
to his efforts. The law requires a foreign investor to file his request forty
days before the date of the actual transaction. The mandatory waiting
period is thirty days, and the Bank of Japan, which oversees all foreign
stock transactions, takes one or two additional days to issue its approval.
Although the Japanese officials have the power to extend for up to five
months, there is no provision for the expiration of the time limit. The
result is that the foreign investor is left with about a week to try to acquire
55. Newpis Hong Kong, Ltd. v. Minister of Finance, Case No. 20 of 1981, Tokyo District
Court, 2d Civil Affairs Division [hereinafter Katakura Case]. The case has been widely
discussed. See, e.g., Katakura Kogyo no Shingaikawase Ho ni yoru Kokushi Shobun To-
rikeshi Seikyu Jiken no Soken [Demand to Withdraw the FECL Listing of Katakura Kogyo],
Shoji Homu, No. 899, at 30 (1981); Court Case Challenges Japan's Openness to Foreign
Investment, Bus. ASIA, March 27, 1981, at 101 [hereinafter Katakura Case]; Crampe &
Benes, Majority Ownership Strategies for Japan, I UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 41, 54-59 (1982);
Smith, The Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative
Guidance: The Labyrinth and the Castle, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 417 (1984).
56. FECL, supra note 2, art. 27 § 1(1); see Katakura Case, supra note 55, at 101.
57. Katakura Case, supra note 55, at 102.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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the desired number of shares. 60 Attempts by Wang to acquire even the
additional one and one-half percent interest were repeatedly blocked. The
Bank of Japan either refused permission or gave ambiguous replies. Wang
and others have charged that "the procedures under the revised law are
so complicated and unclear that the new law represents a step forward
in principle but two steps backward in practice." 6 1
The Katakura case, however, is important not only because it dem-
onstrates the FECL at work, but also because it illustrates the nature and
underlying cause of Wang's frustration. Katakura's management had been
dominated by Fuji Bank, one of the major lenders. Wang had urged that
the company sell off a tract of land to pay off a US$10 million debt, instead
of renting the property to a supermarket at a reduced rate. His suggestion
was ignored by management even though Wang was a major shareholder.62
The Fuji Bank group is one of the most powerful commercial forces in
Japan and, along with other powerful groups, may have been responsible
for the inclusion of Katakura on the list of strategic companies. 63
The lesson arising from Katakura is that government intervention, borne
of special interests, may not be a thing of the past. Significantly, in 1984,
probably due to the great deal of attention the Katakura case received,
Japanese Government officials lifted in principle the limits of foreign
shareholdings in the so-called strategic industries, but implicit limits on
foreign ownership nevertheless remain for most of the designated firms. 64
A relatively recent series of Japanese news releases further confirms the
ever-present government intervention. On February 15, 1984, the Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, a leading business news journal, announced a major
merger.65 Exactly one week later, the same publication carried an an-
nouncement that the Japanese Government had launched an investigation
60. Id. See also Smith, supra note 55, at 474 (noting the various tools at the government's
disposal to thwart foreign investment of designated companies).
61. Katakura Case, supra note 55, at 102.
62. Id.
63. See Bus. INT'L CORP., INVESTING, LICENSING AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD:
JAPAN 6 (1981). The other "listed" companies include Sankyo Co., Ltd., 25 percent; Arabian
Oil Co., 25 percent; Fuji Electric Co., Ltd., 26 percent; Hitachi, Ltd., 30 percent; Tokyo
Keiki Co., 32 percent; General Sekiyu, K.K., 49 percent; Showa Oil Co., Ltd., 50 percent;
Mitsubishi Oil Co., Ltd., 50 percent; Toa Oil Co., Ltd., 50 percent; and Kowa Oil Co.,
Ltd., 50 percent. See Smith, supra note 55, at 472 nn.230 & 234 (companies were selected
because of their then-present threat of takeover and percentages were set at or near the
then-present levels of foreign holdings).
64. See Michelson, Japanese Firms Warm Up to Foreign Suitors, Asian Wall St. J., Oct.
14, 1985, at 8, col. 3; cf. Smith, supra note 55, at 472 ("Since Katakura, no new designations
have been made, and the publicity attendant to the Katakura Case may have made the
government, particularly MOF, reluctant to do so .... ).
65. Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Feb. 15, 1984, at I (major merger at electric company) (Japanese).
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into the area of mergers and acquisitions. 66 Again, with respect to the
hostile bid by Trafalgar Holdings Ltd., the Los Angeles investment firm
of American financier Charles Knapp, to acquire Minebea Co., a Japanese
diversified ball bearing manufacturer, analysts were quick to point out the
fact that MOF approvals would be required. 67 These incidents demon-
strate that Japanese officials are quick to respond to anti-acquisition pres-
sures; indeed, it is difficult to conclude that political-if not legal-barriers
have ceased to be a factor. Moreover, through the unique political mech-
anism of "administrative guidance (gyosei shido)," Japanese ministries
such as MOF and MITI arguably have the tools to interfere, even where
there is no formal legal structure dealing with the subject at hand. 68
B. THE FIRST EXTRALEGAL BARRIER: BUSINESS STRUCTURES
Liberalization of restrictive laws against mergers and acquisitions in
Japan has been promised and, at least in principle, delivered, and yet the
general consensus of analysts seems to be that such activity is still a rare
occurrence. One reason for a lack of acquisition activity is the unique
structure of the Japanese business world. As is shown below, changes in
the laws are vulnerable to the antimerger constraints inherent in this
business structure, in the same way that they are vulnerable to political
constraints.
1. Industrial Groupings
Japanese business is often described as being formed around one of
three general models: the zaibatsu (or industrial conglomerate), the bank
group, and the keiretsu (or industrial family). 69 These industrial groupings
66. Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Feb. 22, 1984, at I (government to study rationalization of
procedure for company mergers) (Japanese).
67. See, e.g., Tanzer, Good Lack Charlie, Forbes, Oct. 7, 1985, at 72, col. 1. Tanzer notes
that Takahashi, Minebea's president felt that MOF approvals would probably not be forth-
coming because a certain percentage of Minebea's sales are to the Japanese military. But
see Jiji Press Tickler Service, Tokyo Report: Minebea, Sankyo Seiki Engulfed in TOB, Sept
12, 1985 (reporting that MOF and the Tokyo Stock Exchange have no power to control
takeover bids by foreign firms, but that the Japanese Government is being urged to take
appropriate countermeasures-including establishing laws and regulations concerning take-
over bids-in response to Trafalgar's bid for Minebea).
68. See generally Smith, supra note 55, at 459-74. See also Tatsuta, Restriction Foreign
Investment in Japan, 3 INT'L EXEC. REP. 15 n.32 (1981) (Securities Bureau of MOF advised
brokers not to accept offers to buy shares in Oji Seishi Co., a leading Japanese paper
manufacturing company, from a Hong Kong investor who was also involved in the Katakura
affair, causing the Hong Kong investor eventually to sell what shares it had to the Mitsui
group, of which Oji Seishi was a member).
69. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 73; see also Isherwood, Aspects of Japan's Business
Interrelationships, in BUSINESS IN JAPAN 113 (P. Norbury & G. Bownas eds. 1980) (noting
that the Japanese economy is dominated by these major groups, the six largest of which
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are combinations of companies that cooperate with each other and provide
support. For example, a keiretsu provides cooperation in marketing efforts
and research and development programs. A keiretsu might consist of a
trading company (which provides insurance, transportation, warehousing,
and financial services), 70 a distribution company and, sometimes,
subsidiaries 7 ' and subcontractors. 72 The keiretsu, as are the other group-
ings, is tied together with interlocking stock ownership and by a pattern
of personal relationships built up over a long period of time. 73 For ex-
ample, subsidiaries or spinoffs of a large manufacturer are often staffed
with personnel from the main company.74 All of these factors help to
explain why the keiretsu is generally closed to a foreign investor.
To a certain extent, of course, personal relationships and ownership
ties are not unique to Japan; such relationships are common among United
States companies and their subsidiaries. In Japan, however, the groups
tend to have a broader base and the ties between the companies within
the group tend to be more functional. In 1974 an incident occurred that
reveals much about the cohesion of industrial groupings. This incident
involved a modern-day zaibatsu. Mitsubishi Oil was responsible for an
oil spill from the tanks of its Mizushima refinery. The spill caused exten-
sive damage to one of Japan's most beautiful areas. The eventual cost of
restitution was estimated at about 50,000 million yen-more than twice
the assets of Mitsubishi Oil as shown on the balance sheet at the time.
Mitsubishi Oil was, in name, part of the giant Mitsubishi zaibatsu, but in
actuality 48.7 percent of its shares were held by Getty Oil of the United
States. 75 Mitsubishi group members initially went out of their way to
disclaim responsibility. The president of Mitsubishi Bank was reported
as having remarked that Mitsubishi Oil was Getty's company, not Mit-
subishi's; the president of Mitsubishi Mining & Cement rejected the idea
that his firm should pay a premium price for products produced by Mit-
subishi Oil to help with the bail out.7 6 But eventually as the losses piled
up, and help from Getty was nowhere in sight, the Mitsubishi group
decided to rally around the oil company and arranged a substantial loan. 77
are Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and those centered around Fuji Bank, Daiichi Kangyo
Bank, and Sanwa Bank, which together command over 40 percent of the total capital
employed by Japan and 30 percent of the total assets; the group pattern is repeated on a
descending scale throughout all Japanese business).
70. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 176.
71. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 73.
72. M. YosH!No, supra note 6, at 159.
73. See generally LINCOLN, KEIRETSU (U.S.-Japan Trade Council, Council Rep. No. 41,
1983).
74. Id.
75. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 76.
76. Id. at 76 n.2.
77. Id. at 76.
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In fact, some speculated that the newspaper releases and disclaimers
might have been a ploy to induce Getty Oil to rescue Mitsubishi Oil. 78
At any rate, the incident shows that relationship with the Japanese group
is more than just nominal. The group provides an economic security
blanket, a sort of "insurance" to members, uncommon in the United
States. This factor may legitimize antipathy toward foreign investment
and help explain why foreigners find it difficult to steal away part of the
group. This same phenomenon may partially explain Fuji Bank's involve-
ment in the Katakura case. 79
In order to explore fully how this group structure works to prevent
acquisitions, the various features of cross-ownership, management con-
trol, high debt/equity ratio, and employment structures are discussed below.
2. Cross-Ownership of Shares
One of the unique outgrowths of the pervasive pattern of industrial
groupings is the fact that, to some extent or another, members of the
group own shares in other members. In 1980, for example, of all the shares
of all listed Japanese corporations, approximately seventy percent were
owned by other corporations. 80 This phenomenon began after World War
II when holding companies, which held the large zaibatsu, were abolished.
A primary rationale given at the time for the development of cross-
ownership patterns was to prevent foreign takeover bids, 8' as well as to
promote stability up and down the vertical chain of companies in the
group. Recalling the discussion of the legal structure, above, reveals that
many provisions in the law call for shareholder approval. A company
whose shares are held by other members of the group will naturally be
reluctant to approve an acquisition of a member, when that member has
a reciprocal power to vote its shares. The same constraint exists against
selling shares to an acquiring company. This tendency is likely to be
magnified where personal relationships have been formed around a central
goal of cooperation and security.82
78. Id. at 76 n.2.
79. Cf. M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that the Nissan-Prince Merger was
especially significant because it cut across banking lines).
80. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 99 n. 6. This trend toward institutional ownership can
be marked against the postwar efforts by the Occupation forces to transfer the holdings of
the large zaibatsu conglomerates to a broad spectrum of the Japanese population. Occu-
pational programs were responsible for distributing up to 42 percent of the total zaibatsu
shares to employees and to the public, with the result that, in 1949, 61 percent of such
shares were owned by individuals. H. OKUMURA, NIHON NO KABUSHIGAISHA [Japanese
Stock Corporations] 16 (1986).
81. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 86.
82. It must be noted that institutional ownership alone cannot explain a lack of acquisition
activity; indeed, in the United States about one-half of the public shares are owned by so-
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An example of how this obstacle is applied can be seen in the Minebea
affair. In response to the proposed bid by Trafalgar Holdings and Glen
International, Minebea announced that it had made plans to merge with
Kanemori Co., a clothing sales concern and Minebea's affiliate. The move
would dilute Minebea's outstanding shares, including those of the un-
wanted suitors. Before that, Minebea placed with friendly investors con-
vertible bonds equaling twenty million shares. This move likewise diluted
the percentage and value of Glen International's holdings. 83 In his state-
ment to the press, Minebea's president Takami Takahashi characterized
the recipients of this issue of bonds as banks and other "stable
shareholders." 84
The pattern of cross-ownership creates another obstacle to unfriendly
acquisitions. Because large blocks of shares are held by "stable" insti-
tutional shareholders, shares available to the market are many fewer than
the total number of issued and outstanding shares. The price for these
available shares can be distorted by even small purchases. This phenom-
enon allows issuing companies to manipulate the prices. 85 Thus, even
though Japanese companies often undervalue real estate assets on their
books,86 which in turn tends to cause undervalued stock prices, Japanese
companies have at their disposal a mechanism to raise prices. 87 This
phenomenon also works to discourage a change in the nature of Japanese
shareholders. One author notes that the higher the percentage held by
Japanese institutional shareholders, the more their market activities in-
crease the price of their stock; these "stable shareholders" become trapped
by the market as "whales in a pond." 88
In 1981, as part of its major legislative reform in this area, the Japanese
Government amended the Commercial Code (Shoho) to regulate the effect
of cross-ownership of shares. This legislative attempt has had little impact.
For example, under the amended code, a subsidiary cannot acquire stock
called institutional investors, such as life insurance companies, investment companies, pen-
sion funds, and so on. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 1985, at 55. Rather it is
the pattern of cross-ownership of shares in Japan that is the source of restriction. For a
historical overview of the development of ownership patterns, see H. OKUMURA, supra
note 80, at 16-27.
83. See, e.g., Harris, Minebea Suitors Plan to Fight Defense Moves, Wall St. J., Nov. 8,
1985, at 6, col. 6.
84. Id. See also Nehon Kezai Shimbun, Sept. 12, 1985, at 17 (quoting Takahashi as stating
that "through this private placement, shares held by the Takami Takshi group, banks and
other stable shareholders will account for 51 percent of the total.").
85. Repeta, Declining Public Ownership of Japanese Industry: A Case of Regulatory
Failure?, in LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 153 (1984).
86. See supra note II and accompanying text.
87. See H. OKUMURA supra note 80, at 200-10.
88. Id. at 208.
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in its parent if the parent owns more than fifty percent of the subsidiary, 89
but this law does little to curtail the purchase of the shares of another
corporation. The amended code also provides that a corporation that has
acquired more than twenty percent of the stock of another corporation
cannot vote such stock, 90 but the new law does not pose any problems
for companies that are actually cross-holding shares; the curtailment of
voting rights in Japan does not accomplish much. The reforms were crit-
icized even by Japanese Diet members as being no solution to the problem
on interlocking ownership of shares. 9 1
3. Management Control
In 1945, in the United States, Berle and Means expounded their theory
that in modern corporations management is divorced from ownership. 92
Institutional structures in the United States, moreover, have worked to
support this ideal: laws regulating proxy contests, 93 tender offers, 94 and
state corporation laws 9 5 work to insure the reality of shareholder checks
against management.
In form Japanese companies are similar to their American counterparts,
but in practice the Japanese management system appears to be relatively
free from shareholder interference. Directors are chosen by top manage-
ment from the ranks of corporate executives. 96 Likewise, although the-
oretically a shareholder prerogative, in-house statutory auditors (jonin
kansayaku) and independent accounting auditors (kaikei kansanin) are
selected in practice by the representative director (daihyo torishimari-
yaku); under normal circumstances pro forma verification follows. The
primary loyalties on the part of such appointed auditors naturally flow to
such director, not the shareholders. 97
89. SHOHO (Law No. 48 of 1899, as amended by Law No. 74 of 1981), arts. 211-212.
90. Id., art. 241, para. 3.
91. See H. OKUMURA. supra note 80, at 36 (citing representative Shiozaki, a member of
the leading Liberal Democratic Party, as saying: "It seems obvious that this restriction of
voting rights does not solve at all the problem of interlocking share ownership.").
92. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
93. 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (1986) (regulating proxy contests).
94. Williams Act of 1968, §§ 13(d), 14(d), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 73(m), 78(n) (1982) (regulating
tender offers).
95. See, e.g., Hudson, The Use of Shark Repellent Charter Provisions to Forestall Hostile
Takeover Bids, 62 MICH. B.J. 522 (1983) (explaining how some U.S. companies have ma-
nipulated state laws to repel takeovers).
96. See M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 210-12 ("under ordinary circumstances-such senior
officers control the appointment of new directors. Once selected, junior directors serve at
the pleasure of their seniors. Thus, as far as the highest ranking executives are concerned,
the board of directors consists exclusively of their subordinates.").
97. See id. at 213 ("Auditors, as is the case with the directors, are, in reality, appointed
by ranking corporate officers.").
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An example of the extent of managerial discretion can be seen from
the 1971 case of Ohba v. Toyota Motor Co.98 In 1968 Toyota Motor Co.,
fearing a potential takeover by a foreign corporation, added a provision
to its charter requiring that all directors and supervisors be Japanese
citizens. A Japanese shareholder brought an action to have the provision
declared void, but the district court held that a nationality requirement
was not unreasonable discrimination under the equal protection clause of
the Japanese Constitution. The court specifically stated that such matters
should be left to management autonomy.99 Although some scholars have
questioned whether the Toyota decision would stand today, i ° ° the case
is illustrative of the different attitude concerning shareholders' rights.
As noted in the Toyota case, a result of management control is that
hostile takeovers can be opposed directly by the parties that have the
most to lose. The directors are not likely to vote in favor of any proposition
that will eliminate themselves from the company or betray the officers
who appointed them. Under Japanese law, moreover, the board can issue
authorized, but previously unissued, shares at fair market value to anyone
it pleases without shareholder approval. It can, for example, issue these
new shares to sympathetic shareholder members of the keiretsu to prevent
a takeover by diluting the acquiring company's shares.' 0 1
Knowing who the shareholders are and assessing the purposes of own-
ership also helps to understand the barrier of management control. As
noted above, the big shareholders, usually banks and trading partners,
overshadow the individual shareholder. The big shareholders' interest is
not that of "shareholder" (to get dividends or investment returns 0 2), but
that of business associate.10 3 These big shareholders have little incentive
to sell off their shares to a would-be bidder. Indeed, given the fact that
in many cases the big shareholders' shares could be sold by the target,
or that some day the target could in turn be a "white knight" to help
stave off a takeover attempt, the incentives seem to be stacked on the
side of helping to resist the acquisition, if the target's management so
desires.
98. 22 Kakyu Minshu 549 (Nagoya Dist. Ct., Apr. 30, 1971).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Tatsuta, supra note 68, at 159 n.35 (noting that it is doubtful that the case
would stand today).
101. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 104; see also discussion accompanying notes 83-84
supra.
102. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 105; cf. T. NISHIYAMA, S-IHAI Kozo RON [A Study
of the Structure of Managerial Control] (1980) (noting that insurance companies have shares
of large corporations in order to get the group insurance policies and pension funds of the
employees).
103. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 100.
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From a larger perspective, since these features of cross-ownership and
management control are the norm for the largest sector of Japanese busi-
ness, the logical assumption is that a great deal of pressure can be applied
not to breach the system. Even if a company were to decide that it should,
in its best interest, sell off shares at a tender-offer price, acting upon such
judgment could give rise to instability in the economy at large. In a system
set up to provide mutual insurance and support, to take such a step toward
self-interest would not be easy.l°4
These same factors may also explain the considerable pressure within
the management group itself to resist acquisitions or mergers of the com-
pany, even when acquiescence to the acquisition would have significant
advantages. Allowing "outsiders" to enter into the group by way of ac-
quisition or merger may upset the equilibrium of the group structure.
Commentators have noted that foreigners are especially suspect because
Japanese fear that foreign control will flout time-honored practice and
"disrupt industrial order. "105 Foreigners may lack the sensitivity created
by long personal relationship built by years of reciprocal favors and in-
teraction. Their "business judgment," may therefore fail to take into
consideration the impact of crossing or betraying an affiliated company.
4. High Reliance on Debt
In Japan the company has typically relied on debt, rather than capital,
to finance its operations. As late as 1980 the debt-equity ratio of the
average company was estimated to be about 85:15, much higher than that
of companies in the United States. 106 As would be expected, the lenders
are almost always shareholders of the company 10 7 and exert some degree
of influence on it. For example, when Toyo Motors encountered financial
difficulties, its lenders reportedly attempted to help by sending their ex-
ecutives to act as directors of the company. 108 Under the antimonopoly
law, banks are prohibited from acquiring more than five percent of another
company, 10 9 but the banks can still exert considerable influence. In Japan,
moreover, banks are not the only source of credit. Credit is often obtained
through the discounting of bills and notes by a trading company or other
104. See generally T. NISHIYAMA, supra note 102 (noting that in Japan the system has
made the director's position independent from the public shareholders).
105. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, HOW THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
SEE EACH OTHER'S ECONOMY 53 (1974).
106. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 107.
107. Id. at 102.
108. Id.
109. Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni kansuru Horitsu [Act
concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fare Trade], Law No. 54
of 1947 (as amended), art. 1I, § 1.
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affiliated supplier of raw materials. 110 These trading companies, again
almost always shareholders, can exert tremendous pressure on their debt-
ors. It would be to their disadvantage, therefore, to see a foreign company,
with its own supply of capital and its own agenda, take over the Japanese
target. If necessary, moreover, creditors of the target can demand a prior
liquidation of all debts before the acquisition takes place.1"'
An illustration might help to clarify how this influence is translated into
pressure to resist an attempted acquisition. Suppose that Katakura is
affiliated with a group centered around Fuji Bank. It is assumed that,
although Katakura has long-standing relations with other banks, it has
traditionally financed its operation by loans from Fuji. Moreover, other
members of the Fuji group, including Fuji itself, have bought shares in
Katakura. Finally, Katakura uses a Fuji group trading company that reg-
ularly takes Katakura's negotiable paper and forwards it to Fuji at dis-
counted rates. A chief Katakura shareholder, Wang, now wants to buy
up ;hares of Katakura so he can compel Katakura to sell off an asset to
pay back loans, a move opposed by management. Fuji is hardly motivated
to betray its customer. In fact, Wang's motive might be to liquidate the
debts so that he can move further outside of the Fuji network. Fuji stands
to gain little by way of economic return because the number of its shares
are limited; its "investment" is the security of a long-time financial re-
lationship. Fuji, moreover, may also be in a position to deter others within
the group from selling. The Fuji group trading company also has been
able to use its creditor status to influence Katakura to trade through it;
the trading company, thus, has little motivation to lessen this leverage or
to see a foreigner gain control and cause Katakura outside the group to
obtain services or goods presently being supplied by the trading company.
5. The Employee System
Employers in mainstream Japanese companies may have quite different
expectations than their American counterparts. This difference may also
explain the lack of acquisitions and mergers in Japan.
First, in mainline Japanese organizations the top employee echelons
expect to be eventually in control. This expectation is borne out of years
of devotion to the company and, more often, to immediate superiors who
now may be in a position to appoint their "disciples" into positions of
power. 112 The advent of outside control would naturally jeopardize this
expectation; resistance to such a change would be natural.
110. See, e.g., TANI, Function and Practice of Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes,
§ 3.02[2], in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN (1982).
I1I. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Second, in mainline Japanese corporations, unions are not organized
along industry lines (steel workers or auto workers, for example) as they
are in the United States; rather, unions in Japan are organized along
company lines. 13 Unions do not usually oppose management or take an
adversarial position. In fact, one observer notes that forty-six out of one
hundred thirty-four Japanese companies surveyed had directors who were
originally officials in the company's union. 114 Moreover, the unions often
represent the interests of both white- and blue-collar employees.' 15 Unions
in Japan, therefore, may have little incentive to encourage a takeover by
outsiders since such a takeover might be perceived as a disruption to the
pattern of life within the company. Examples abound of how unions have
joined with middle management to stave off a merger or acquisition at-
tempt. One such incident was the attempt by Sumitomo Bank, one of the
most powerful banks in Japan, to merge the Kansai Mutual Bank into
itself. Even though the Sumitomo group collectively owned fifty percent
of Kansai, opposition by the employees forced abandonment of the
effort.' 16
Third, Japanese employees' expectations are influenced by the system
of lifetime employment, and advancement and pay by seniority. Although
workers do in fact leave Japanese companies, even the large ones,1 17 the
ideal established by the practice of lifetime employment and seniority by
the mainline Japanese companies does appear to block acquisitions and
mergers. For example, with the exception of persons with technical skills
in newly developed industries or persons involved in the numerous family-
run "cottage" industries, there seems to be little precedence in Japan for
lateral mobility among most occupations. Once a person joins a company,
the expectation is that he will stay until retirement age.' 1 8 Any attempt,
or indeed even a contemplation, to terminate a member of the management
group would be met with fierce opposition and anxiety on the part of all
employees. Likewise, the seniority system makes it difficult either to bring
in personnel from outside or to demote ineffective leaders and promote
capable ones; any of these acts would breed insecurity and be viewed as
a breach of the natural obligation that flows from the dedication and loyalty
shown by employees who have given their lives to the company. Further,
as noted above, the amended FECL gives employees a check on the
113. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 105.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id.; see also Ballon, Management Style, in BUSINESS IN JAPAN supra note 69 (noting
that because there is no real difference between management and labor in Japan, there is
a convergence, not a divergence, of interest).
116. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 107 n.21.
117. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 141.
118. Id.
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transfer of their employment contracts,1 9 a fact that might also translate
into a means of legal obstruction.
6. The Interrelationship between
Business Practice and Law
If the new FECL were to be applied in the United States, it might have
a decidedly different impact. Although management in America is indeed
worried about control and corporate stability, the widely dispersed pattern
of stock ownership and the economic purpose of the average owner makes
it relatively easier to obtain new shares or influence other shareholders
to override the prerogatives of management. Although American labor
unions fret about job security, the fact that unions are organized along
industry lines tends to weaken the incentive to oppose an acquisition-
unless, of course, the new management seeks to establish a non-union
shop-and the strong demarcation between management and labor may
even tend to push labor into the "black knight's" camp. Also, although
interpersonal relations may exist between the management of a parent
and a subsidiary, business judgments in the United States tend to ignore
such factors; if an action makes sense on the bottom line, it will not
usually be questioned, and indeed will be applauded by shareholders
seeking increased dividends.
It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the nature of the company
structure in Japan is a major reason why acquisitions are not more com-
mon in Japan. In fact, it can be argued that these company barriers are
broader in scope and harder to change than legal barriers, because they
are structural in nature as opposed to regulatory. For example, a law may
provide for the possibility of a corporate shareholder's divesting itself of
all of its shares of a floundering subsidiary and the corporation may have
good reason for doing so. A Japanese decision maker, however, must
consider the impact of such divestment on relationships with other com-
panies, the resistance within management and labor ranks, and perhaps
even the effects of such a move on its reputation in the Japanese business
community and ultimately even among Japanese consumers. These fac-
tors are legitimate business reasons and they cannot be explained away
simply by accusations of protectionism.' 20 Rather, just as in any trans-
action involving sophisticated business judgments, a company wishing to
capitalize on the advantages of acquisitions and mergers as a way of
119. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Lehner, Spat between Friends, U.S. and Japan, Heating up on Both Sides
of the Pacific, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1982, at 30, col. I (noting protectionist accusations by
U.S. diplomats).
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entering the Japanese market must deal within the framework of this
structure to find the proper combination of incentives and assurances.
C. THE SECOND EXTRALEGAL BARRIER: SOCIAL VALUES
Another type of obstacle is often mentioned by commentators: the so-
called "social" or "cultural" factors. These factors are general themes
inherent in Japanese culture said to restrict acquisition activity. Unlike
laws and regulations, they cannot be changed rapidly. Unlike business
judgments, they are not to be compromised. They are, rather, to be under-
stood. These so-called cultural values may indeed help explain the impetus
behind the laws and business structures discussed above. Too much can
be made of the immutable aspect of culture, however. Even though general
cultural values are often cited as barriers, they are virtually never alone
the cause of restriction.
1. "Flesh-Peddling" and "Hijacking"-
A Breach of the Confucian Ethic
One obstacle often mentioned in regard to acquisitions and mergers is
that the Japanese' company is an extension of the concept of the family;
the company cannot be separated from the people who comprise it. 121
The sale of a Japanese business, therefore, is said to have the flavor of
the sale of people.' 22 It is said to be immoral. 123 Even the Japanese
vocabulary used in acquisitions supports this view. The purchase of a
company in Japan is called "nottori," which can be translated as "a
hijacking." 124
The scope of this paper does not allow for adequate exploration into
the derivation of this phenomenon, but it is important to list several well-
known Japanese historical themes. The first is familism. Throughout Jap-
anese history leaders have applied the Confucian notion of family-"ie"
or "house"--to political1 25 and business 126 organizations. Chie Nakane,
in her famous book, Japanese Society, writes the following:
121. See Lehner, Japan's Aversion to Selling Companies May Be Ultimate Barrier to U.S.
Trade, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1982, at 38, col. I.
122. Id.
123. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 17.
124. Nishimura, supra note 10, at 97, see also K. KANZAKI, KiGYo BAISHU NO JITSUMU
TO HORI [Law and Practice of Corporate Acquisitions] 63 (1985) (noting that the parties
who perpetrated attempted takeovers suffered bad reputations among Japanese).
125. For an application of the ie metaphor to the nation as a whole, see J. BENNETT &
1. ISHINO, PATERNALISM IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 264 (1963).
126. See R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 14 (discussing the concept of ie applied to Tokugawa
merchant institutions); M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 25 (noting the use of ie throughout
the Meiji period).
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The equivalent in modern society of ie and ichizokuroto [one family group
and its retainers] is a group such as "One Railway Family" (kokutetsuikka),
which signifies the Japanese National Railways. A union, incorporating both
workers and management, calls this "management-labour harmony." Though
it is often said that the traditional family (ie) institution has disappeared, the
concept of ie still persists in modern contexts. A company is conceived as an
ie, all its members qualifying of the household, with the employer at its head.
Again this"family" envelops the employee's personal family; it "engages" him
"totally" (marugake in Japanese). The employer readily takes responsibility
for his employee's family, for which, in turn, the primary concern is company,
rather than relatives who reside elsewhere .... 127
This analogy has been perpetuated by slogans and traditional practices.
For example, the "life-time employment system" has the new employee
in about the same position as if he were a newly born member of the
family. 128 Likewise, the "seniority system" is said to follow the traditional
pattern of commercial and agricultural management that was centered
around a household or group of households. 129
The "family" or ie analogy, however, although it does certainly add to
the strength of management and labor who oppose acquisitions, is, stand-
ing by itself, an unsatisfactory explanation of why such acquisitions are
difficult. The analogy is rooted in, and perpetuated by, economic reality,
rather than pure ideology. In the early development of Japanese indus-
trialization, factory workers moved from company to company at a fairly
high rate, just as workmen and artisans of preindustrial urban Japan had
moved freely from job to job. This mobility, however, caused uncertainty
and inconvenience to employers.130 In addition, the practice of the time
was to fill the shortage of labor with young girls from the surrounding
agricultural community. 131 In order to curtail the mobility of skilled labor,
owners and management wisely extolled the advantages of lifetime em-
ployment. To appease the fathers of the young girl substitutes, manage-
ment began taking upon themselves the role of surrogate father, which
role was underscored by the Confucian inspired doctrine of paternal-
ism. 132 Management policies based on these principles gave rise to various
welfare benefits, company housing at nominal rates, and the like. 133 These
policies and practices became useful to management in encouraging work-
ers to give full measure back to the company. Leaving the company for
127. C. NAKANE, JAPANESE SOCIETY 7-8 (1970).
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 16-17.
130. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 39; M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 69.
131. R. CLARK, supra note 20, at 38.
132. Id. at 39; M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 75 (noting that paternalism as an ideology
grew in response to an effort by laborers and their families to legislate working conditions).
133. C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 16.
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higher pay elsewhere was denegraded as a breach of loyalty. 134 Govern-
ment policy even reinforced labor immobility. Military leaders, for ex-
ample, argued that concentrated service to a factory-family could best
serve a worker's larger family-Japan. 135
This brief historical outline leads to two important conclusions. First,
social values can be and indeed were used to forge business practices and
ideals. Second, and more important for the purposes of this discussion,
the use of social values in Japan has two components, one structural and
one ideological. For a would-be acquiring company to distinguish the two
is critical. Structural problems cannot easily be argued away. If the ac-
quiring company is planning to replace the target company's management
after the acquisition, for example, the acquiring company's principals
must confront the fact that the departing managers will not easily be able
to find a lateral-entry position in another firm. This problem is structural
and cannot simply be negotiated away. On the other hand, the immorality
of a sale or purchase of a company is an ideological problem and, as such,
may be combated by economic factors as well as by effective counter-
propaganda and careful efforts to promote goodwill.
2. The Effects of Vertical Group Orientation
Japanese are generally regarded as group conscious, as opposed to being
individualistic. 136 This feature of society is seen as hindering acquisitions
and mergers on two levels. On the macro level, companies themselves
tend to form into groups. 137 As discussed above, this group identity and
overall structural organization can have a chilling effect on entry by an
outsider. On a lower level, both between companies of the same group
and within a given company, personal relationships form in such a way
as to enhance this overall chilling effect on outsider involvement.
Again, an historical explanation of the group orientation phenomenon
is quite without the scope of this article, but it seems fair to say that
group consciousness has been at least strengthened by Confucian ideol-
ogy. Ranking by seniority, for example, is the accepted norm. 138 Many
commentators in Japan have noted that within virtually all organizations
vertical ties develop between those of senior and junior rank. The senior
134. Id.
135. See M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 79 (noting that the reinsurgence of paternalism
during the war was not fortuitous, but was favored by government as a policy to counter
the rise of independent labor unions in the democratic Taisho era following World War I).
136. See, e.g., C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 3. ("In group identification, a frame such
as a 'company' or 'association' is of primary importance; the attribute of the individual is
a secondary matter.")
137. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
138. M. YosHINO, supra note 6, at 236; C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 25-39.
VOL. 21, NO. I
EXTRALEGAL BARRIERS TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN JAPAN 119
takes the role of "parent" (oyabun) and thejunior takes the role of "child"
(kobun). 139 Rarely are horizontal relationships formed between equals,
because in a seniority ranking system those who enter the company at
the same time become competitors; an individual's success or failure
seems to depend on connections with persons directly above and below
in the organization.
In a vertical ranking system factions, endemic in Japanese organiza-
tions, 140 are inevitable. This factor has an especially chilling effect on
mergers. The merger of two groups can take place only if one absorbs
the other, or if a leader emerges satisfactory to both. The first possiblity
causes tremendous insecurity on the part of the weaker faction. For ex-
ample, when Prince Motors merged with Nissan Motors, the employees
of Prince were discriminated against by the employees of Nissan and were
subject to humiliation. 14 1 Similar fears would pervade an attempted ac-
quisition in Japan because any shift in management would disrupt the
group structures. If the acquiring company is foreign, moreover, there is
also the potential threat that the foreign ownership would be insensitive
to these institutional relatives.
That such fears can translate into obstruction can be seen from the
proposed merger between the Asahi Beer Company and the Sapporo Beer
Company. The two representative directors of the companies were on
good terms, having been together in the Dainihon Company, the parent
of both Asahi and Sapporo, before the companies were divided soon after
World War II. Both were in favor of merging. When it was announced
that Yamamoto, the director of Asahi, was to become the director of the
new Dainihon Company, the executive staff of Sapporo joined together
to oppose the proposal. They claimed that Yamamoto was known as a
despot and refused to work under him. Rather, they wanted to continue
with their own leader, Matsuyama, recognized as a democratic leader.
Professor Nakane commented that Matsuyama's subordinates "felt that
the problems of day-to-day organization were of more importance and
relevance" than the significant economic benefits of the merger 142 and
then added: "One might ask why [Matsuyama] did not force his men to
agree with the merger, by exercising the advantages of his popular lead-
ership .... If he had forced a merger against the will of his employees
he would have risked their devotion and collaboration."' 143
139. C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 42.
140. Id. at 57.
141. See S. KAMATA, JAPAN IN THE PASSING LANE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF LIFE
IN A JAPANESE FACTORY (1982).
142. C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 57.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
WINTER 1987
120 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The group orientation factor need not be an insurmountable barrier,
however. Again, it is important to distinguish between the structural and
ideological manifestations of the cultural norm. Another example will
illustrate. A merger was contemplated of three companies that before the
war were parts of the same zaibatsu. Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industries
Company, New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Company, and Mitsubishi
Ship Manufacturing company were to join together to form Mitsubishi
Heavy Industry Company. 144 Professor Nakane contrasts the experience
of the directors in this negotiation as follows:
[T]he key figure was Mr. S. Fujii. Mr. Fujii had become director, after having
been the president, of New Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Company after the
sudden death of the company's former director. He was respected as sempai
[senior] by the other two directors, was known as a man of great achievement
and was far from being an egocentric personality. He was, in addition, a former
colleague of the presidents of the two other companies; the three men had
entered Mitsubishi at almost the same period and had worked together, so that
it was not difficult for the other two directors to become directors under Mr.
Fujii. The success of the merger of these three companies derived from the fact
that it destroyed none of the internal structure of the companies and caused no
disruption of the traditional ranking system which has always been particularly
prized by Mitsubishi men. 145
The group orientation ideology has indeed contributed to the structural
barriers noted above, but as this example shows, the ideology itself is no
impediment to a merger or acquisition. There seems to be no overriding
mental block against acquisitions in Japan. Challenges exist, but can be
stated in finite terms; the solutions exist, but require detailed planning
based on a thorough knowledge of the market and the target, its support
systems, and its people.
III. Toward a Formula for Acquisitions
and Mergers in Japan
If an acquisition is to be accomplished in Japan, the above analysis
suggests a fairly narrow formula. Of course, as a threshold matter, the
acquiring company must comply with any relevant legal requirements
including, for political reasons, touching base with the appropriate gov-
ernment authority. 146 In addition, the acquiring company must thoroughly
educate itself as to the nature of the market and the possible acquisition
targets to discover the extent to which the generalizations concerning the
structural barriers above are applicable, and if so, how to plan to overcome
them. The following discussion will help elaborate this formula.
144. M. YOSHINO, supra note 6, at 189.
145. C. NAKANE, supra note 127, at 56 (emphasis added).
146. See Reynolds, supra note 14, at 198.
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A. THE CONTRASTING MODELS OF MERCK
AND TRAFALGAR HOLDINGS
The respective acquisition activities in Japan of two American com-
panies provide a possible forum for analyzing the impact of so-called
cultural factors. One of these companies accomplished, over a long period
of time and after a long and successful relationship, the acquisition of a
majority interest in a Japanese pharmaceuticals manufacturer. The other
company has been engaged in what news reports have termed the first
foreign hostile takeover bid for a Japanese company. The contrast between
these two cases illustrates dramatically the viability of structural barriers,
on the one hand, and the weakness of pure cultural ideology on the other.
1. Merck Acquires Banyu-A Possible Model
On August 4, 1983, Merck & Co., a diversified corporation located in
New Jersey, announced that it had worked out an agreement to acquire
about fifty-one percent of Banyu Pharmaceutical Company of Tokyo. 147
The transaction is particularly significant because it appears to be the first
and the largest American acquisition of a majority interest in a publicly
listed Japanese company. 148 The arrangement was for Merck to buy twenty-
four million newly issued Banyu common shares as well as bonds con-
vertible into an additional forty million Banyu shares. 149 The history of
this transaction seems to confirm the analysis above as well as suggest a
possible model for other companies.
The first observation is that the pharmaceuticals market is an ideal target
for acquisition in Japan. The chemical industry is one that tends to be
fragmented and overcompetitive. 150 It is a relatively new industry, unlike
steel or heavy industry, which is dominated by the conservative influences
of the modern zaibatsu or keiretsu, and it therefore relatively free of some
of the structural barriers, such as cross-ownership of shares, mentioned
above. It is an industry that requires technical know-how, technology that
American firms like Merck are likely to have. In this case, Merck was
able to provide Banyu with much-needed new products.151 The Japanese
147. See Merck-Banyu, supra note 4.
148. Ames, Entering the Japanese Market Via Acquisitions, JAPAN ECONOMIC REPORT
4 (Apr. 12, 1985); cf. Interview with Masuda, Partner, Masuda & Ejiri, in Tokyo, Japan
(March 12, 1986) (noting that Britain's BOC's acquisition of a majority share in Osaka Gas
Co. occurred prior to the Merku-Banyu deal). For a list of subsequent acquisitions, see If
You Can't Beat 'Em, Buy 'Em: Takeovers Arrive in Japan, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 29, 1986,
at 80 [hereinafter Takeovers Arrive].
149. Ames, supra note 148; see Merck-Banyu, supra note 4.
150. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
151. See Michelson, supra note 64. Michelson notes that incentives have played a large
part in recent acquisitions. Britain's BOC Group, for example, had the technology that
allowed Osaka Gas Co. to diversify in the industrial gas market.
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pharmaceuticals market is also a healthy one, second in the world behind
only the United States. 152 Furthermore, the American market for these
products is also large, possibly an attractive selling point to Japanese
management. Banyu itself enjoyed a fairly strong position in the Japanese
market; it was "among the 10 largest pharmaceutical concerns in Japan." 53
A second observation is that Merck and Banyu did not reach the agree-
ment overnight; the two companies had a long, amiable, and successful
relationship. A report of the acquisition notes that Merck, a producer of
health products and specialty chemicals, had had distribution agreements
with Banyu for more than thirty years. 154 They also had shared a Japanese
joint-venture company, Nippon Merck-Banyu, which had manufactured
and marketed Merck pharmaceuticals in Japan for more than twenty-five
years. 155 The two companies obviously knew much about each other and
had a working relation built on trust. The Japanese management was
obviously able to overcome their own insecurities as well as those of their
employees to allow the deal to go through. Indeed, initial press reports
implied that Banyu was in need of extra capital 156 and, this time at least,
the Japanese management chose continued affiliation with their American
partner, rather than increased dependence on any Japanese sources of
financial aid. 157 To Merck the move was seen as having long-term positive
effects, giving them a "distribution network in the entire Far East" and
insuring a "significant future in a strong foreign market."1 58
2. Trafalgar Holdings' Attempted Takeover
of Menebea-Lessons to Be Learned
In stark contrast to the Merck-Banyu deal is the bid by Trafalgar Hold-
ings Ltd., a Los Angeles based investment firm, to acquire control of
Minebea Co., a Japanese company and world leader in the production
of precision ball bearings. The story is loaded with ironies, not the least
152. Merck-Banyu, supra note 4.
153. Id.
154. Rapoport, Why More Marriages Are Being Made in Japan, Financial Times, Sept.
4, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
155. Id. See also Kasagi, Merger "Nemawashi": Doing Deals in Japan, 18 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 6 (1983) (discussing the proposed 100% takeover by the Rorer Group of
Pennsylvania of Kyoritsu Yakuhin Kogyo; Kasagi notes that mergers between strangers is
possible but takes time and nenawashi (persuasion and preparation)).
156. Id.
157. Several economically oriented arguments can be made for affiliation with a foreign
company. First, a smaller company can escape dependence on Japanese trading companies
and thereby avoid a third level of fees. Second, by escaping the Japanese social framework,
a company might be more free to make its decisions based purely on economic factors.
Third, it can avoid "takeover" by Japanese financial institutions. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
158. Merck-Banyu, supra note 4.
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of which is that Minebea had just completed its acquisition of a major
American maker of ball bearings, Hampshire Ball Bearings, for 110 million
U.S. dollars, 59 and was in the midst of making its own less-than-friendly
bid for a Japanese precision electronics firm, Sankyo Seiki Manufacturing
Co. 160 Into the fray entered Trafalgar. In August 1985 Trafalgar announced
that it had acquired from Glen International, a British securities firm, an
option to purchase convertible bonds and warrants of Minebea that, if
converted, would amount to twenty-three percent of the company. This
percentage would make Trafalgar Minebea's largest shareholder. 161 Also
in August Glen International acquired an additional ten million shares of
Minebea.' 62 Trafalgar stated that it would seek the cooperation of man-
agement, but if rebuked would proceed with a takeover bid. 163
Minebea countered Trafalgar's overtures with a demonstration of the
defensive tools available to Japanese companies against foreign invest-
ment. First, Minebea warned that according to the FECL, a foreign inves-
tor who acquires ten percent or more of the shares of a Japanese company
must send notice of further investment of MOF and that such investment
must receive MOF approval.164 Moreover, because around two percent
of Minebea's sales are to the Japanese military, Minebea has claimed that
MOF would probably not give such approval. ' 65 Minebea announced that
it was making a private placement to "stable shareholders" of sixteen
billion yen in new convertible bonds, which would convert to twenty
million shares. This transaction would give Minebea's main shareholders
fifty-one percent of Minebea's total shares. Minebea announced that, if
necessary, it would issue a second similar placement. 166 In yet another
159. Japan Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 6, col 5; see also Tokyo Gets Its First Taste of
Greenmail, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 56 (noting that Minebea's flamboyant pres-
ident, Takami Takahashi, had founded Minebea's success on a series of 24 acquisitions;
most friendly bailouts of troubled companies which is the typical Japanese approach).
160. Burgess, Japan Wrestles with American Style Takeover Bids, Washington Post, Sept.
18, 1985, at F5, col. 1. Minebea quietly obtained a 19 percent interest in Sankyo and, after
the news of its holdings was released in the Japanese economic press, announced that it
was opening talks with Sankyo for a merger. Sankyo responded by saying it was not inter-
ested and immediately began its own defensive maneuvers by lining up support among its
main banks and stable shareholders. The main banks and major shareholders, accounted
for 55 percent of all outstanding stock. Sankyo's main banks, moreover, reportedly promised
to acquire additional shares if necessary to fend off the attack.
161. Japan Times, Aug. 28, 1985, at 7, col. 4. Apparently, Glen International had offered
to sell its holdings to Minebea, at double the market price; Minebea refused.
162. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Oct. 10, 1985, at 18.
163. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Aug. 27, 1985, at 1 (evening ed.).
164. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 3, 1985, at 1.
165. See Tanzer, supra note 67 (noting that Minebea had nevertheless just purchased a
United States company with ties to the Pentagon).
166. Japan Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at 10, col. 1. The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan
took 3 billion yen, Sumitomo Trust Bank took 3 billion yen, and an affiliate of Minebea
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move, Minebea announced its planned merger with Kanemori Co., a
clothing concern and Minebea's affiliate, a move designed to further dilute
the holdings of Minebea's outstanding shareholders, including Trafalgar
and Glen International. 167
Several observations emerge from this rather complex episode. First,
government intervention does not appear to be a thing of the past. In spite
of MOF's publicly proclaimed policy requiring that public offerings be
given priority over private placements, MOF made an exception to Mi-
nebea's private placement of twenty billion yen aggregate amount of con-
vertible bonds, reported to be the first private placement of convertible
bonds of a listed stock exchange company in history. MOF explained that
"there is no logical reason to always ban the private placement of con-
vertible bonds." Japanese securities firms called this an "exceptional,
emergency measure," and news analysts were quick to recall MOF's 1980
decision to designate Katakura as a limited investment firm because of
"national securities" reasons. 168 In addition, Minebea has won in the
Japanese courts. Despite the apparent injury to Minebea's shareholders,
the Nagano District Court dismissed Trafalgar's and Glen International's
suit to thwart the Minebea-Kanemori merger. The court ruled that the
planned merger was justified by legitimate business-related reasons. 169
A second and most significant observation is that, while structural fac-
tors certainly have aided Minebea's defensive moves, the so-called "cul-
tural" and "psychological" barriers have played only a minor role.
Minebea's chairman, Takahashi, stated to the media that Trafalgar's bid
would fail because of Japanese disdain for hostile takeovers. 170 His actual
defensive strategy, however, relied almost entirely on structural barriers.
His proposed friendly merger with Kanemori and private issue of con-
vertible bonds to stable shareholders reflect the strength of cross-share-
holdings and perhaps other economic factors not uncommon in the United
States. Indeed, since Minebea itself has attempted the hostile takeover
of Sankyo Seiki, a resort by Minebea to cultural themes as a defense
seems awkward to say the least. 17 1 This is not to say, of course, that the
Japanese business community is cheering for Trafalgar to succeed. In-
took 10 billion yen. Minebea's strategy was to thwart Trafalgar from any action at a share-
holders meeting.
167. Harris, supra note 83, at 4, col. 4.
168. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 12, 1985, at 17. For a discussion of the Katakura case
see supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
169. Japan Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 12, col. 4.
170. Japan Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 6, col. 4; Gilliott, Japan Firm vows to Fight Knapp
Takeover Bid, Associated Press, Oct. 17, 1985.
171. See Gilliott, supra note 170 (noting that Trafalgar's counsel accused Takahashi of
"hypocrisy" for defending Minebea's breach of Japanese custom to seek control of Sankyo
Seiki but relying on such customs to deny Trafalgar's proposal).
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deed, the possibility of the institutionalization in Japan of unfriendly take-
overs has seemed to cause a major reaction, but so far such reaction has
not differed in spirit from that of the typical American corporate man-
agement faced with the possibility of takeover. 172 Moreover, the evidence
suggests that more and more Japanese corporations themselves are con-
sidering the advantages of acquisitions. 173
B. SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS
The discussion above of the Merck-Banyu and Trafalgar Holdings-
Minebea transactions leads to some possible conclusions concerning the
relationship between legal liberalization and extralegal obstacles to ac-
quisitions. These conclusions are general in nature and, of course, will
have to be weighed against the facts of any specific goals or opportunities.
They do form, however, a general two-faceted theoretical approach to
foreign acquisition in Japan.
1. Assess the Strength of Structural Barriers
The choice of a market or a company within a market brings concom-
itant effects. An acquiring company must, for example, assess the nature
and relative restrictive effect of interlocking ownerships and whether the
company is heavily aligned with a zaibatsu, keiretsu, or bank group. Heavy
indebtedness to one source or a past history of bailouts by members of
an industrial group may indicate a degree of control of management
decision-making and another tier of approvals needed for the acquisition.
These factors will also indicate an avenue of recourse for management,
even in the case of a bankrupt or near-bankrupt company that might
otherwise be vulnerable to a takeover.
172. Several news reports noted, for example, that the major impact of Trafalgar's move
would be to curtail the practice of raising money by issuing convertible bonds in foreign
markets and move back into the protective grasp of their banks, see, e.g., Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Sept. 16, 1985, at I (noting that Japanese firms are moving back to establish closer
relations with their main banks as well as narrowing the number of banks they deal with),
and to strengthen relationships with stable shareholders, see, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
Aug. 15, 1985, at 13; in other words, the reaction of Japanese firms has been to turn to
traditional anti-takeover defenses.
173. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Sept. 9, 1985, at I, which discusses a survey of major
Japanese corporations and concludes that a majority of such corporations would be inter-
ested in taking over other corporations. Although the majority of these companies said they
would only do so if the target company was willing, they expressed the view that there was
a weakening in shareholder relations and a change in management morals concerning the
acquisition of other corporations. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Aug. 30, 1985, at 17
(noting that banks are increasing their activities in mergers, acquisitions and corporate tieups;
Fuji Bank, The Bank of Tokyo, Sanwa Bank and Mitsubishi Bank have acted, for example,
as intermediaries in about one hundred such transactions).
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Some observers have noted, however, that economic realities have forced
changes in attitudes of certain Japanese shareholders. Japanese scholars
have stated, for example, that the mounting, competitive nature of the
insurance industry in Japan 174 has forced life insurance companies to seek
a larger return in the form of dividends. 175 This trend may eventually
mean that institutional shares held by insurance companies can be pur-
chased under circumstances similar to those in the United States. 176 Some
authors, in addition, have noted a subtle weakening in the relationships
between banks and certain corporate clients because of the loosening of
monetary controls and the shift toward direct financing methods such as
the issuing of corporate bonds. 177 Minebea itself seems to have been in
this category. Companies that engage heavily in such practices might be
trying to draw themselves away from bank influences.
As noted above, new companies with a reliance on high technology
seem to be the ripest for foreign investment. These companies tend to be
less dependent on traditional group structures. In fact, many of these
companies have relatively mobile employees, at least those employees
highly trained in advanced technology. More significantly, because they
tend to have an insatiable need for information regarding technological
advances, they may be compelled to seek alignments with American in-
terests that can help satisfy such need.178
If a company is not new, it may still be vulnerable to foreign interests
because of an exploitable weakness. For example, a need to gain access
to the U.S. auto market may have been the impetus behind a series of
agreements between Japanese and American automakers wherein the
American companies were able to obtain a substantial-but short of a
controlling-interest in the Japanese concerns. 179 A lack of capital, like-
174. See Seiho Money ga Kigyo o Yusaburu [Money of Life Insurance Companies Shakes
Up Enterprises], NIKKEI BUSINESS, October 14, 1985, at 14 (noting that the life insurance
industry in Japan is almost saturated, with 91.3 percent of the Japanese households already
owning some form of insurance, and that company profits have been shrinking due to higher
rates of return to customers).
175. See Toyo Keiza (weekly), July 27, 1985, at 92.
176. Certain barriers remain to insurance companies leaving the ranks of "stable share-
holders." Japanese insurance law, for example, prohibits capital gains from being distributed
to policyholders. Hokken Gyo Ho [Insurance Industry Law], Law No. 41 of 1939, as
amended, arts. 86, 87.
177. See, e.g., Y. MIYAZAKI, NIHON KEIZAI NO KOZO TO KoDo [The Structure and
Behavior of the Japanese Economy] 202 (1985).
178. See Takeovers Arrive, supra note 148. All of the 14 acquisitions listed by Business
Week have been in the "high tech" or pharmaceuticals areas: Opthalmic instruments (I),
medical equipment distribution (2), computers (I), information equipment distribution (1),
pharmaceuticals (5), semiconductors (I), and meters/testers(l).
179. Abegglen, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that General Motors has acquired 34 percent
of Isuzu; Ford has acquired 25 percent of Toyo Kogyo).
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wise, may make attractive foreign affiliation where independence from a
trading company or bank is desired. In fact, a respectable argument can
be made that in certain situations reliance on a foreign company may be
desired precisely because of cultural and social factors that make mergers
with or dominance by other Japanese the basis of discrimination. 180
2. Distinguish, Yet Be Sensitive
to, Social Ideologies
This article has drawn a distinction between structural barriers and
political, social, or cultural ideology. Even new or progressive companies
in Japan may have incorporated in one form or another the traditional
institutions of "lifetime employment," "seniority ranking system," and
company-based unions. These features of the Japanese company, if they
exist, must be considered by the acquiring company, since a threat of
disruption to these institutions will undoubtedly cause strong resistance.
On the other hand, barriers borne out of social ideology, such as the
"immorality of selling people," can be overcome by any approach de-
signed to satisfy the pragmatic demands of business structures. The Merck-
Banyu case, for example, suggests that one effective approach is to start
building a relationship slowly by small-scale investments or joint-ventures.
Indeed, such activity has been on the increase in Japan and seems to be
fully supported by large sectors of the Japanese market. 181 Moreover, the
fact that acquisition activity seems to be increasing among Japanese com-
180. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
181. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1983, at D4, col. 6 (noting IBM's 35 percent acquisitions
of the Japanese Business Computer Company); Abegglen, supra note 3, at 20 (noting other
companies, Oscar Mayer (25 percent of Prima Ham), Merck (30 percent of Terii & Co.),
General Motors (34 percent of Isuzu), Ford (25 percent of Toyo Kogyo) and BOC (a "sig-
nificant equity position" in Osaka Oxygen) which have engaged in acquisition of shares).
For a detailed list of foreign acquisitions in Japan and an insightful characterization of
such acquisitions see generally Ames, supra note 148. Dr. Ames concludes from an analysis
of the historical acquisitions that the most important factors for identifying potential targets
are (1) a relatively weak financial position, (2) a consensus among government and industry
that the products are not of strategic importance to Japan and (3) that the industry is not
of strategic importance to Japan's overall economic success. Significantly, these factors are
basically economic and political, not psychological. An update to the list of foreign invest-
ments noted in the Ames article is found in Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, JEI REP.,
Aug. 16, 1985 (blaming cultural differences "in large part" for problems faced by foreign
investors).
For a comprehensive list of recent investment activity in Japan by foreign entities, see
THE JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Dec. 7, 1985, at 15, which lists the 298 foreign investment
cases reported during Sept. 1985 to The Bank of Japan and MOF. See also Takeovers Arrive,
supra note 148 (discussing the successes of Corning Glass Works, Coopervision, Data
General, Merrell Dow, Motorola, Rorer Group, Eastman Kodak, Emerson Electric, and
others).
WINTER 1987
128 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
panies themselves also supports the view that psychological barriers can
be overcome. 182
IV. Conclusion
Japan may indeed by the most attractive market for foreign investment
in the world; it has a stable government, strong currency, low inflation,
and a consistently high growth rate. Likewise, internal Japanese pres-
sures, such as fragmentation of some markets producing over competition,
undercapitalization, and the need for technology and access to foreign
markets, which would normally tend to make attractive the selling off of
certain enterprises, even to foreign firms. Nevertheless, acquisitions and
mergers have been rare in Japan. This article has endeavored to explain
some of the factors that have contributed to this phenomenon. New laws,
though unmistakably more liberal, are still subject to antiforeign political
pressures. They still require, moreover, the virtually unanimous agree-
ment of the acquired company's board of directors. In addition, the way
in which businesses are organized and managed in Japan may create
difficulties in obtaining that approval. These structural barriers, however,
must be distinguished from social or cultural ideologies that have been
highly touted as creating virtually insurmountable antipathy toward ac-
quisition and merger activity. Social ideologies will inevitably yield to
economic reality as well as careful planning, sensitivity, and other factors
that form the basis of universally accepted sound business judgment. In
Japan acquisitions and mergers may only be for the truly determined, but
in the long run the well-informed foreign investor can find the tools needed
for success.
182. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 4, 1983, at 9 (citing the acquisition of Yashica Co.,
Ltd. by Kyocera Corp., as an example of such activity).
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